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Pekka Väyrynen
1. Introduction
Much of recent metaethics, and meta-normative inquiry more generally, dis-
plays a turn to reasons. In the air wafts a confidence, even if not a definite 
program easily attributable to particular people, that appealing to reasons – 
in the normative sense in which reasons are good grounds for acting, think-
ing, or feeling in certain ways – will better enable us to account for various 
normative and evaluative phenomena than appealing to value or any other 
notion. This paper argues that it is hard to reconcile taking reasons as fun-
damental in explaining various evaluative and normative phenomena with 
certain explanatory demands regarding reasons themselves. Its aim is to 
sound a skeptical note against the confidence that turning to reasons will 
offer special advantages in dealing with real theoretical problems when it 
comes to explaining various normative and evaluative phenomena.
Section 2 sets the stage: it describes why evaluative and normative phe-
nomena typically call for explanation and what constraints apply to such 
explanations under a turn to reasons. Section 3 quickly delineates some 
different forms that such explanations might take. Sections 4–7 then argue 
that various explanations of each form either fail to favor turning to rea-
sons in particular or else are inadequate with respect to the constraints that 
apply to them, unless perhaps a kind of reductionism about reasons, which 
is typically rejected by those who favor turning to reasons, is true. Their way 
of turning to reasons thus enjoys no special advantages over other ways of 
meeting comparable explanatory demands regarding normative and evalu-
ative phenomena. Turning to reasons offers no short cut.
2. Normative explanation and reasons
It is widely agreed that nothing is brutely right or wrong, good or bad, admi-
rable or terrifying, just or unjust. Things bear normative and evaluative 
properties in virtue of some other properties. The distribution of normative 
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and evaluative properties over these other properties seems neither acciden-
tal nor groundless; there should be some explanation of their distribution. 
If this piercing feeling in my neck is bad, that is no brute fact; or so I want 
to say. Suppose I say that the feeling is bad in virtue of being painful. This 
looks like an explanation: it specifies something because of which the feeling 
is bad, something that is at least part of why it is bad.1 
But now I have another evaluative fact to explain. For the explanation 
that I gave presumes that the painfulness of the feeling makes it bad to 
some degree or in some way. The truth of this kind of evaluative claim isn’t 
a brute fact either; or so I want to say.2 When such claims are true, in virtue 
of what are they true? 
Normative facts concerning reasons for actions or for attitudes are, on 
the face of it, no different: they aren’t groundless and they typically call for 
explanation. Here I mean ‘normative’ reasons: units or considerations that 
make systematic contributions to, and thereby explain, the overall norma-
tive statuses (such as ‘required,’ ‘permitted,’ ‘appropriate,’ etc.) of the actions 
or attitudes for which they are reasons. Normative reasons can be stated by 
saying that some considerations are a reason, weaker or stronger, for some 
person in certain circumstances to do something.3 Such statements refer to 
a relation that holds between a proposition or a fact P, a set of conditions 
C, and an activity of Φing (such as taking a course of action or adopting an 
attitude like belief, intention, approval, etc.), when P is a reason (of degree of 
strength D, at time T) for someone in C to Φ.4 When I talk about reasons, I 
have in mind this type of relation. When I talk about properties or features 
that ‘provide’ reasons, I mean properties ascribed to things by the facts or 
propositions that slot in for ‘P’ in reason relations. I’ll simplify by omitting 
degree and time references and by taking ‘conditions’ or ‘circumstances’ to 
include the properties of agents. (This doesn’t sacrifice theoretical neutral-
ity; normative reasons may still be held to depend on whether they bear 
some suitable relation to some motivational fact about the agent.5) Reason 
relations can then be expressed by a relational predicate R(P, C, Φ). Reason 
claims of this form entail that, when there is a reason to Φ, there must be 
something that is the reason, something that speaks in favor of Φing or 
makes Φing sensible in C. This fact or proposition P will often, if not always, 
be some ordinary fact or proposition about the world. It will be a further 
normative fact about P that P is a reason to Φ in C.6
Now consider some specific examples. If the only way I can save my life is 
to jump out of the window, the fact that jumping will save my life is a reason 
to jump. If I promised my mother that I would call her, the fact that calling 
her will fulfill a promise is a reason to call her (but, one hopes, not the only 
reason). The fact that there is loud music and chatter coming from across 
the street is, in many circumstances, a reason to believe that the neighbors 
are having a party. Many people would allow that the fact that parachuting 
is thrilling is, in many circumstances, a reason for those who desire a thrill 
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to go parachuting. What I want to say is that the truth of claims about what 
is a reason for what isn’t a brute fact. So, again, we should be able to ask in 
virtue of what these normative claims, when true, are true.
Suppose I say that the fact that jumping will save my life is a reason to 
jump because prudence requires me to save my life, and that the fact that 
calling will fulfill a promise is a reason to call because morality requires 
me to fulfill my promises. These explanations presume that requirements 
of prudence and morality distribute in a certain way over other facts.7 But 
what I want to say is that their distribution isn’t a brute fact. Various facts 
about reasons call for explanation as much as any other normative and eval-
uative facts. Just as one wants not merely a list of valuable things but also an 
explanation of why value distributes in that way, so one wants not merely 
a distribution of reason relations over facts, circumstances, and actions or 
attitudes, but also an explanation of why that distribution is the one that 
holds.
It feels difficult to find a satisfactory explanation of many of these sorts 
of normative and evaluative facts. So I take it that there is a real problem 
concerning their explanation.8 Would turning to reasons advance this 
enterprise? Such hope is in the air. For instance, some people find it hard 
to assess whether something is of intrinsic value (roughly in the sense of 
Moore, 1922) until they begin to consider how they have reason to act or 
feel towards it.9 Such a response suggests that reasons can be invoked to ana-
lyze or explain what it is to be intrinsically valuable.10 But, although the idea 
is in the air, little has been done to state it clearly. I’ll articulate my target by 
describing different forms a turn to reasons might take.
It is common to claim that the normativity of all that is normative consists 
in its relation to reasons. But claims to this effect can be more or less inclusive 
with respect to the category of the normative.11 If ‘normative’ means ‘deon-
tic,’ as contrasted with ‘evaluative,’ such claims entail only that reasons are 
fundamental with respect to other deontic notions, such as right, wrong, and 
ought. This is compatible with thinking that reasons are grounded in consid-
erations of value or explained thereby, or that neither deontic nor evaluative 
notions are explained by the other.12 If ‘normative’ includes also the evalu-
ative (for instance, if value is, inter alia, such as to generate reasons), then 
taking reasons as fundamental in the normative domain entails that they 
are fundamental with respect to other deontic and evaluative notions.13 My 
interest concerns this more inclusive turn to reasons.
Irrespective of its scope, a turn to reasons can take at least three forms, 
depending on whether reasons are supposed to be conceptually, metaphysi-
cally, or explanatorily fundamental. A conceptual turn holds that the con-
cept of a reason is the fundamental normative concept, in the sense that 
this concept is the sole normative element in any normative concept. Most 
of those who endorse this claim also take the concept of a reason to be 
primitive: it can be at most paraphrased, but not analyzed, in other terms, 
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normative or otherwise. A common paraphrase is that a reason to Φ is a 
consideration that ‘counts in favor’ of Φing.14 So reasons are conceptually 
fundamental in the domain of normativity.
A metaphysical turn to reasons holds that the nature of normative prop-
erties of various sorts – moral rightness and wrongness, various forms of 
value, or whatever the normative includes – has to do with the relation to 
reasons for actions or for attitudes. One local instance of a metaphysical 
turn is the claim that moral rightness (wrongness) consists in having prop-
erties that provide reasons of certain kind and strength for (against) action. 
If the normative includes the evaluative, then other local instances include 
the kind of ‘buck-passing’ account of value according to which to be good or 
valuable is to have some other properties that provide reasons of an appro-
priate kind to favor their bearers,15 and the view that such evaluative facts 
as that something is terrifying or that something is amusing consist in there 
being reasons of an appropriate kind to be terrified by it or amused by it. So 
reasons are metaphysically fundamental in the domain of normativity in 
the sense that the nature of normative properties, or at least their normativ-
ity, consists in their relations to reasons.
An explanatory turn to reasons holds that normative notions are to be 
accounted for in terms of reasons. One local instance of this kind of turn to 
reasons is the kind of ‘buck-passing’ view of value according to which the 
fact that something is valuable is explained by its having other properties 
that provide reasons of an appropriate kind to favor it. In general, in so far 
as evaluative and normative facts generally call for explanation in the way 
discussed above, they can be understood or explained in terms of reasons 
that there are, in certain circumstances, for actions or for attitudes such as 
beliefs, intentions, or feelings. So reasons are explanatorily fundamental in 
the domain of normativity.
Explanation of normative facts might not be a concern to all of these 
versions of the turn to reasons. A conceptual turn to reasons, for instance, 
might not be troubled by a demand for such explanations. It allows that 
when some fact is, in some circumstances, a reason to Φ, there is an expla-
nation why, but it appears to carry no particular commitment as to what 
explains this. It is perfectly possible that the concept of a reason has no 
analysis in other terms, normative or otherwise, and yet picks out a rela-
tion that consists in some complex of independently characterizable factors, 
such as the promotion of value or of desire satisfaction, or the instantiation 
of which can be explained in some such terms.
The explanatory turn to reasons, however, is subject to the explanatory 
demand. It grants that various normative and evaluative facts call for expla-
nation. Since the grounds for thinking that they do so seem to apply equally 
well to facts about reasons, then reasons also call for explanation. Much the 
same holds for the metaphysical turn to reasons in so far as it grants that 
normative facts to the effect that some fact P is a reason to Φ in C aren’t 
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brute or groundless. My interest in what follows lies in an explanatory turn 
to reasons, understood to include this sort of a metaphysical turn. The idea 
of such a turn is in the air, even if no writer has fully articulated it or explic-
itly endorsed it in full generality.16 How far an appeal to reasons in under-
standing various normative and evaluative phenomena can be pushed is 
also of significant interest independently of whatever actual currency the 
idea happens to enjoy.
One might still wonder whether it really is reasonable to hold an explana-
tory turn to reasons to the demand that there must typically be an expla-
nation of why some fact P is a reason to Φ in some circumstances C (or, 
for short, why a reason to Φ is a reason to Φ).17 One sort of thought is that 
reasons will need no explanation in so far as reason relations hold neces-
sarily, when they hold at all, and that at least the fundamental reason rela-
tions do hold necessarily. (The particular facts that provide reasons often 
hold contingently, when at all, but contingent facts can stand in necessary 
relations.)
Many necessary truths, however, call for explanation and don’t seem 
brute. One example is the widely accepted, if not uncontroversial, super-
venience of the normative on the non-normative. Supervenience relations 
hold necessarily, when they hold at all, but most philosophers agree that if 
there can be no normative difference (and hence no difference in reasons) 
without a non-normative difference, this requires explanation.18 But surely 
it isn’t the mere number of metaphysical impossibilities in how reasons and 
non-normative facts may be recombined that makes supervenience require 
explanation. Just the same demand for explanation applies to such specific 
claims as that it is metaphysically impossible that the entire universe could 
be exactly like it actually is in all non-evaluative, non-normative respects 
but the fact that my mother is my mother is a reason for me to torture her 
(Schroeder 2007, p. 71). But now notice that we are at least very close to 
thinking that reason relations also typically require explanation even if they 
hold necessarily. Why should they be special in requiring no explanation?
Another sort of thought is that some reasons need no explanation because 
it strikes us as obvious that they are reasons. Suppose that the fact that a 
person’s child has died is a reason for her to feel sad. Or suppose that, for a 
person in control of a car, the fact that if the steering wheel isn’t turned the 
car will injure or perhaps kill a pedestrian, but if the wheel is turned the car 
will hit no one, is a reason to turn the steering wheel.19 If these claims strike 
us as obviously true, then explanations of the reasons they report might be 
superfluous with respect to many epistemic functions which explanations 
typically serve.
This doesn’t, however, mean that a theoretical demand for an explana-
tion of reasons is out of place. For a fact may be obvious and yet not brute or 
inexplicable. Nor does it follow that there is nothing more to say about why, 
or in virtue of what, a fact cited as a reason to Φ is a reason to Φ. To illustrate, 
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suppose that value is normative in the sense that something is good (bad) 
only if there are reasons to favor (or disfavor) it. So far as this goes, it could 
be that it is the goodness of something that explains the reasons to favor it 
or that some third factor explains both its goodness and the reasons, rather 
than that the reasons to favor it explain its goodness. So there had better be 
something to say in explanation of these reasons which shows why explana-
tions that don’t involve turning to reasons are closed off.
These considerations suggest a constraint on explanations of reasons 
under an explanatory turn to reasons. If reason relations typically require 
explanation but they are explanatorily fundamental relative to other nor-
mative and evaluative notions, then explanations of reasons must typically 
satisfy a ‘normative fundamentality’ constraint:
NF constraint: When a fact P is under conditions C a reason to Φ, expla-
nations of this normative fact may not appeal to any evaluative or nor-
mative factors which don’t themselves concern reasons.
The NF constraint is by no means trivial. It would be a substantive claim to 
say that every explanation of why P is a reason to Φ in C is itself a reason, 
even if by other name. (Clear cases of this kind, as when a derivative reason 
is explained by the reason whence it derives, don’t exhaust explanations of 
reasons.20) But, in so far as explanations of reasons failed the NF constraint, 
reasons wouldn’t be metaphysically or explanatorily fundamental in the 
normative domain. If reasons to Φ could be explained, for instance, in terms 
of the prospective value of Φing, then it wouldn’t seem to be very plausible 
that what it is for Φing to be of value is for it to have other properties that 
provide reasons of an appropriate kind to Φ. Or, if what it is for something 
to be a reason to Φ were for it to play a role in explaining why one ought to 
Φ, then it wouldn’t seem to be very plausible that reasons are explanatorily 
fundamental with respect to what one ought to do, since their normativity 
would derive from that of ought.
An explanatory turn to reasons can take different forms depending on 
what counts as an appropriate explanation of reasons. We saw that, even if 
some evaluative and normative facts don’t call for explanation relative to 
some epistemic functions of explanation, a demand for some other type of 
explanation can still be legitimate. One type of explanations which figure 
in understanding a wide variety of phenomena are ‘constitutive’ or ‘ground-
ing’ explanations. These explain phenomena by laying out the conditions 
in which those phenomena consist or in virtue of which they obtain. The 
fact that I am older than my sister consists in my age, her age, and a certain 
ordering between them. And something is a member of the singleton {Pinky} 
by being Pinky, not Pinky in virtue of being a member of {Pinky}; the fact 
that something is a member of {Pinky} consists in the fact that it is Pinky.21 
If reason relations aren’t explanatorily brute or groundless, a demand for a 
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constitutive explanation of why P is a reason to Φ in circumstances C would 
often seem to be legitimate. Surely at least sometimes, when such a reason 
relation holds, there will be conditions in which the fact that P is a reason 
to Φ in C is grounded or consists, or in virtue of which the reason relation 
holds.22
One might doubt that a demand for a constitutive explanation of rea-
sons is typically legitimate. Contextually variable reasons clearly call for 
explanation. If some facts are a reason to Φ in some circumstances but not 
others, then there should be some explanation as to why those facts are a 
reason to Φ, when they are, and why they aren’t a reason to Φ, when not. But 
explanations in these cases might work by contrasting some cases in which 
those facts are a reason with other cases in which they aren’t and by relat-
ing the case at hand to that contrast, or they might work by laying out the 
circumstances in a certain kind of way or order. Such explanations might, 
in other words, rest on coherence or narrative relations among various non-
normative features of situations, instead of appealing to factors in virtue of 
whose presence or absence the facts in question are or aren’t a reason to Φ.
Even here, however, it seems to be legitimate to ask why some particular 
contrasts or differences between circumstances, but not others, make for 
a difference in what certain facts are a reason to do or what it is about the 
particular contextual constellation of features that makes it the case that 
those facts are a reason to do one thing and not a reason to do something 
else. How else is laying out the circumstances of the context or contrasting 
them with others supposed to explain why some facts are a reason to Φ, if 
not by indicating why some contextual features or differences are relevant 
to whether those facts provide reasons? One might have thought the norma-
tive bedrock to run deeper than that.
What I take away from all this is that it remains reasonable to demand 
that an explanatory turn to reasons provide constitutive explanations of why 
a reason to Φ is a reason to Φ which satisfy the NF constraint. One way to 
explain reasons consistently with the NF constraint would be to show that 
reason relations reduce to some non-evaluative, non-normative properties or 
relations. (An example would be the view that the reason relation reduces to 
some non-evaluatively specifiable utility property, such as happiness, plus the 
maximizing relation.) Such a reduction base wouldn’t consist in evaluative or 
normative factors which don’t themselves concern reasons. And yet, if As are 
reducible to Bs, then we can use the B-phenomena in the reduction base to 
explain the reducible A-phenomena (Horgan, 1993). Note here that, if reasons 
were so reducible, other evaluative and normative notions might be reducible 
in a parallel way. A substantial question would remain whether those notions 
could also be systematically explained in terms of reasons, leaving reasons 
explanatorily fundamental within the normative domain.
In fact, however, most of those who are sympathetic towards turning to 
reasons reject reductionism about reasons. They would therefore have to 
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try to satisfy the NF constraint through explanations of reasons which take 
some different form. Much of the discussion to follow works through vari-
ous possible solutions to this problem.
My focus will be specific: can an explanatory turn to reasons explain facts 
about reasons consistently with the NF constraint but without being pushed 
in the direction of reductionism? But the problem is a general one when it 
comes to explaining evaluative and normative facts under fundamental-
ity constraints such as the NF constraint. Analogous constraints are thus 
likely to apply to other putative explanatorily fundamental factors in the 
normative domain. Much of the discussion to follow may thus generalize 
fairly directly to proposals to turn to other evaluative or normative notions. 
This wouldn’t, however, affect the main upshot of this paper, which is that 
turning to reasons offers no distinctive advantage in solving hard and deep 
problems concerning the explanation of normative facts.
Some readers may be inclined to draw a further moral that some suitably 
sophisticated reductionist account of normative and evaluative properties 
is beginning to look like an attractive explanatory hypothesis. So long as 
our notion of reduction isn’t Neanderthal, a reductionist account needn’t 
involve implausible semantic claims, or eliminate the reduced property, or 
otherwise make it any less real. Reductionism about reasons may or may 
not be true, but it isn’t the bogey man of normativity that it is sometimes 
taken to be.
3. Reasons and explanation: some distinctions
Putative explanations of reasons can be classified along at least two dimen-
sions. One concerns what kind of facts can be reasons. That is, what kind of 
facts may slot in for ‘P’ in R(P, C, Φ)? The other concerns what kind of factors 
explain the (further, distinct) normative fact that some fact P is a reason to 
Φ in C. Distinctions under these headings can be used to generate templates 
for explanations of reasons.23 One distinction under the first heading is 
that the facts that are reasons will be either non-evaluative, non-normative 
aspects of the world or else at least partly evaluative or normative in char-
acter. One distinction under the second heading is that either the factors 
that explain why certain facts provide the reasons they do are distinct from 
those facts or they aren’t. Irrespective of whether these explanatory factors 
are distinct from reasons, they will likewise be either non-evaluative, non-
normative aspects of the world or else at least partly evaluative or normative 
in character.
4. Intrinsicality
One tradition in moral philosophy regards acts as duties simply because of 
the types of acts that they are.24 One way of trying to explain why certain 
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facts are reasons would be to generalize this idea and say that some facts are 
reasons intrinsically and other reasons are explained in terms of their relation 
to these. Something is intrinsically F if it has intrinsic properties in virtue of 
which it is F. For instance, the property being square is an intrinsic property 
and the property being square or married is an extrinsic property; but the latter 
is a property that all squares have intrinsically, in virtue of being squares.25 
Similarly, G.E. Moore denies that being valuable is an intrinsic property but 
thinks that some things are intrinsically valuable: their value is intrinsic in 
the sense that they have it solely in virtue of their intrinsic properties (Moore, 
1922, p. 260). Since we can think of the claim that something is F in virtue 
of some intrinsic properties as entailing that its possession of those proper-
ties at least partly explains why it is F, this strategy might be thought to fit 
with an explanatory turn to reasons. If some facts were reasons intrinsically, 
these reasons could be explanatorily fundamental without requiring a deeper 
explanation in terms of some distinct further factors.
If some things are reasons intrinsically, then the intrinsic features in 
virtue of which they are reasons will be either non-evaluative and non-
 normative, or else at least partly evaluative or normative, in character. Some 
evaluative and normative facts would seem to be good candidates to be 
intrinsically reason-giving facts, in virtue of their particular evaluative or 
normative character. If you have a right to physical integrity, this might be 
a reason not to hit you, and if treating you in a certain way would be bad 
for you, this might be a reason not to treat you in that way. But, unless these 
descriptions of the facts are mere shorthand for claims about reasons, the 
explanations of reasons they provide violate the NF constraint. And, if they 
are shorthand for claims about reasons, the reasons to which they refer will 
require explanation. Thus an explanatory turn to reasons cannot allow rea-
sons to be explained in terms of any evaluative or normative character that 
they might have intrinsically.
So might any non-evaluative, non-normative features be reasons intrinsi-
cally? If any were, pain would seem to be a good candidate. After all, nearly 
everyone agrees that, if something is painful, that is (at least defeasibly) a 
reason to avoid it or make it stop. But would it be plausible to claim that it is 
intrinsic to, or otherwise part of, what pain is that the fact that something is 
painful is (at least defeasibly) a reason to avoid it or make it stop?26
I have three distinct worries here. The first is that theories of pain tend 
not to support this kind of normative claim. For instance, most functional-
ist and other physicalist theories of pain provide no resources for defending 
it. The second worry concerns errors and disagreement about reasons. If 
someone denies that the fact that something is painful is a reason to avoid 
it or make it stop, it seems neither that their mistake is mere ignorance 
about what pain is, nor that our disagreement concerns merely the nature 
of pain. The third worry is that, if the fact that something is painful were 
intrinsically a reason to avoid it or make it stop, then painfulness would be 
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a normative property. This would be a surprising metaethical commitment 
for an explanatory turn to reasons to carry. Furthermore, appealing to the 
nature of pain in explaining reasons would in this case seem to violate the 
NF constraint after all.27
The general point I am making doesn’t require that all of these worries 
be effective with respect to pain in particular, but only that they generalize 
well enough to make it doubtful that there would be enough intrinsically 
reason-giving non-normative facts to explain the rest of the reasons there 
are. The worries raised above make this much doubtful.
5. Evaluative facts and reasons
Next I’ll discuss the role of evaluative and normative facts in explanations 
of reasons. Such facts might figure in such explanations in two ways. First, 
some evaluative and normative facts might count as reasons in virtue of 
their particular evaluative or normative character.28 For instance, one rea-
son to go shopping today might be that there are lots of good things on 
sale today. An explanation of this normative fact would presumably rely on 
the positively valuable aspects of the things on sale, other than just their 
low price. (Otherwise reasons would turn us to the likes of Poundland and 
Dollar Store much more than they actually do.) And pointing out what is 
valuable about friendship might be a good way to explain why the fact that 
someone is my friend gives me reasons to act in certain ways. Second, the 
factors that explain why some non-evaluative, non-normative facts pro-
vide the reasons they do might be evaluative or normative in character. For 
instance, it might be that what explains why the non-evaluative fact that a 
holiday resort is pleasant is a reason to visit it and recommend it to friends is 
that, if a resort is pleasant, this makes it good in certain ways or respects.
So-called ‘value-based’ accounts of reasons presumably take one or the 
other of these forms.29 Unsurprisingly, then, each is inconsistent with an 
explanatory turn to reasons, unless the claims about goodness in the reason 
statements or explanations of reasons which they offer are mere shorthand 
for claims about reasons.30 But this is unclear, to say the least.
Suppose that the following may in some contexts be an adequate explana-
tion of what is bad or inappropriate about taking pleasure in making others 
suffer:
In taking pleasure in the suffering of others one is displaying insensitiv-
ity to their suffering, and a lack of concern for it, which is particularly 
reprehensible if one is oneself the cause of the suffering, and could have 
prevented it. (Raz, 2001, p. 52)
This explanation could be taken to specify in what the badness of tak-
ing pleasure in making others suffer consists, at least proximately if not 
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ultimately. It appeals to factors that have evaluative flavor, so it may be 
subject to further explanatory demands. As I have indicated, the explana-
tory issues at stake are general, not specific to reasons. What isn’t easy to see, 
however, is what further illumination would be provided by saying that the 
fact that taking pleasure in the suffering of others would display insensitiv-
ity to their suffering, and lack of concern for it, is a reason against doing so, 
and an especially strong reason if one is oneself the cause of the suffering.
What emerges here is that, if reasons are to be explanatorily fundamental 
in the normative domain, then neither things that are reasons nor factors 
which explain their status as reasons should involve evaluative or (non-
reasons-based) normative aspects of our circumstances. This commitment 
of an explanatory turn to reasons is further confirmation that it is subject 
to the NF constraint. The extent of (explanations of) reasons which are most 
plausibly treated as evaluative in character – and with it the plausibility of a 
turn to reasons – depends on many controversial issues.
One way to illustrate the potentially wide sweep of this commitment is 
to consider how so-called ‘thick’ concepts and properties, such as generous, 
courageous, brutal, and cruel, matter to explanations of reasons. A maximally 
non-committal characterization of thick concepts is that they have some 
substantive non-evaluative content and their use is connected, in some 
close-knit way, with evaluation. According to a popular family of views, 
they are evaluative concepts whose applicability typically implies or signals 
the presence of reasons for action.31 What would an explanatory turn to 
reasons say about such reasons?
It is a matter of dispute whether thick concepts and the properties they 
can be used to ascribe are evaluative in the same way as thin concepts, such 
as good, right, and ought, or evaluative at all. But suppose such facts as that 
something is cruel or that it is generous at least sometimes provide reasons 
even if they aren’t evaluative facts. Those reasons would presumably require 
explanation. Thus, on the one hand, if thick concepts aren’t evaluative 
but the properties they ascribe provide reasons, these reasons are among 
those which an explanatory turn to reasons is committed to explaining 
either in non-evaluative, non-normative terms or else in normative terms 
which only concern reasons. For otherwise it will fail the NF constraint. 
If, on the other hand, thick concepts and the properties they ascribe are in 
themselves evaluative, then their bearing on an explanatory turn to rea-
sons depends on whether or not their evaluative and non-evaluative aspects 
can be divided into distinct components. For instance, if generosity can be 
understood as the property of being disposed to act in certain ways F1, ... , Fn 
(specifiable in wholly non-evaluative terms) towards others, and being good 
in a certain way for being so disposed, then it will be coherent to under-
stand this latter, evaluative component in terms of reasons provided by the 
fact that something has or would manifest such a disposition. But, if thick 
concepts cannot be understood in this way, then it would seem that the 
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reasons provided by the properties they ascribe will have to be explained 
in evaluative terms.32 So, if thick concepts are evaluative, they can be used 
to explain reasons consistently with the NF constraint only if their evalua-
tive and non-evaluative aspects are separable. This would be a controversial 
substantive commitment.
A further worry about reasons associated with the applicability of thick 
concepts concerns their explanation under the NF constraint. Suppose gen-
erosity is a complex property divisible into two components: a disposition 
to act in certain ways towards others plus there being reasons to respond 
to people in certain favorable ways in virtue of their having or manifesting 
this disposition.33 This might seem to be able to explain why the fact that 
someone is generous implies reasons to respond to it in certain favorable 
ways. For such a fact is now understood in terms of the existence of reasons 
to respond favorably plus a specification of what provides those reasons. 
But what explains why having or manifesting the disposition provides the 
reasons that it does? The normative element of generosity itself merely states 
that it does. The NF constraint requires either that the explanation be non-
evaluative and non-normative or else that it appeal to some other factors 
concerning reasons.
In short, an explanatory turn to reasons faces exactly the same questions 
that arise for any account of thick concepts, and comes with controversial 
commitments regarding thick concepts in so far as these come with reasons. 
But, for all that, it seems to provide no distinctive advantage in answering 
these questions or explaining these reasons.
6. Non-normative explanations of reasons
We have seen that explaining reasons consistently with the NF constraint 
requires that the facts that are reasons be non-evaluative, non-normative 
facts. Thus, reasons to go to a concert will be such things as that doing so 
would be stimulating or fun, reasons to add a certain spice to what one is 
cooking will be such things as that adding it would bring out, balance, or 
complement such-and-such flavors of such-and-such other ingredients, and 
so on. And we have seen that the NF constraint doesn’t allow explaining the 
status of such facts as reasons in non-evaluative or normative terms. I’ll now 
discuss whether their status as reasons can be explained in non-evaluative, 
non-normative terms or else in normative terms concerning reasons.
The most straightforward version of the former, non-normative option 
is the claim that the fact that P is a reason to Φ in C consists in P, C, and 
Φ. No doubt reason relations are in some sense grounded in their relata. 
But surely merely listing their relata fails to explain them, unless some-
thing about the relata explains why they are so related. The clearest such 
cases are factors that have evaluative or normative content, in so far as these 
might be reasons intrinsically. But on the present view the reason relata are 
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to be described in non-evaluative, non-normative terms. So this option is 
unpromising for an explanatory turn to reasons.
A better way to assess the prospects for non-evaluative constitutive expla-
nations of why P is a reason to Φ in C is to consider the properties of such 
explanations. Even if we don’t understand exactly what it is for something 
to consist in some conditions or obtain in virtue of them, or how explana-
tions that appeal to such a relation work, we know some things about what 
the relation isn’t like. One example (an unsurprising one, given that super-
venience relations often require explanation themselves) is that the super-
venience of reasons on the non-normative as such isn’t enough to furnish 
it. Even if there can be no difference in reasons without a non-normative 
difference, this alone determines no particular distribution of reason rela-
tions. It entails the existence of some reason relations to begin with only if 
reasons nihilism is false.34 For, if there were no reasons, it would follow trivi-
ally that, if two cases differ with respect to reasons, they must also differ in 
some non-normative respect.
Even if we conjoin supervenience with substantive normative assump-
tions to the effect that some particular non-normative way things are is 
co-instantiated with a particular reason relation, reasons won’t be explained 
by their supervenient character. For supervenience provides only a non-
symmetric and purely modal sort of determination, whereas explanatory 
relations are asymmetric and not purely modal.35 Facts can be determined, 
in that sense, by conditions which don’t constitute or explain them. For 
example, given a coarse tripartite division of the space of temperature con-
ditions, being neither hot nor cold determines being warm (Oddie, 2005, p. 
153). But clearly the latter doesn’t consist in the former. Thus factors F1, ... , 
Fn can well fail to explain why P is a reason to Φ in C even if this reason rela-
tion cannot fail to hold when F1, ... , Fn obtain. This means also that truth-
makers of reason claims may not provide constitutive explanations of them. 
The literature on truth-making nearly uniformly assumes that, if an entity 
α makes a proposition P true, then α couldn’t exist without P being true. 
Such necessitation isn’t enough for explanation. But what more there might 
metaphysically be to the truth-making relation is rarely discussed.
Supervenience can be used to illustrate one further constraint on constitu-
tive explanations. The supervenience base for any property can be taken as 
a disjunction of every possible minimally sufficient set of conditions for the 
instantiation of that property. But it would be a significant theoretical cost 
if the distribution of reason relations over non-evaluative, non-normative 
features of the world had only a fundamentally disjunctive explanation. For 
that would mean that the reasons in this distribution would have nothing 
distinctively in common. Moreover, the supervenience relation itself allows 
each disjunct to include an extremely broad set of non-evaluative features, 
or even, at the limit, all of the non-evaluative features of the entire possible 
world in question. But being forced to allow that P’s being a reason to Φ in 
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C may consist in the entire world being a certain non-evaluative way F1, ... , 
Fn would seem to be a significant theoretical cost. For that would be to allow 
that constitutive explanations may fail to differentiate those aspects of the 
world in virtue of which P is a reason to Φ in C, those in virtue of which Q 
is a reason to ψ in D, and so on.
The conditions which constitutive explanations select as those in which 
P’s being a reason to Φ in C consists must also support the modal prop-
erties of reasons. Recall from Section 2 the idea that it is metaphysically 
impossible that the entire universe could be like it is actually in all non-
 normative respects, but the fact that my mother is my mother is a reason for 
me to torture her (Schroeder, 2007, p. 71). Whatever reasons the fact that my 
mother is my mother gives me, the conditions in which these reason rela-
tions consist should support metaphysical impossibilities of this kind where 
they hold. And if some reason relations hold necessarily, the conditions in 
which their holding consists should support their necessity.
In sum, then, if reason relations have constitutive explanations in non-
evaluative, non-normative terms, there are strong reasons to think that 
the conditions in which the various reason relations consist aren’t fun-
damentally disjunctive and that this constitutive relationship isn’t purely 
modal but can support or ground the sorts of modal features that reason 
relations may have. These constraints can be met if reason relations are 
reducible to non-evaluative and non-normative properties or relations, 
since there will be no other way for P to be a reason to Φ in C than for P, 
C, and Φ to have these properties or stand in these relations, and nothing 
else will be required for them to do so.36 But it is hard to imagine a plau-
sible account of constitutive explanations of reasons in non-evaluative, 
non-normative terms which doesn’t push towards a reductionist account 
of reasons. Other explanatory domains don’t readily suggest a model for 
such explanations.
An independent consideration against the plausibility of constitutive 
explanations of reason relations in non-evaluative, non-normative terms 
concerns their fit with the ‘autonomy of ethics’, the thesis that there is 
no reasonable inference, deductive or non-deductive, from purely non-
 evaluative, non-normative premises to evaluative or normative conclusions. 
Ordinary normative discourse obeys this constraint. For instance, if we see 
someone realize that jumping out of the window is the only way they can 
save their lives and infer that this fact is a good reason for them to jump, we 
tend not to think that they have drawn a terrible inference. We tend instead 
to interpret the inference charitably as implicitly relying on further evalu-
ative or normative premises, such as that their life is worth continuing and 
that one has a reason to take the necessary means to worthwhile courses of 
action.37
Explanatory relations may not themselves be inferential relations. But one 
would still expect that, if A explained B, this would say something about 
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what would be reasonable or good about an inference of B from A. If P’s 
being a reason to Φ in C consists in conditions F1, ... , Fn, one would expect 
there typically to be a reasonable, even if non-monotonic, inference from 
F1, ... , Fn to R(P, C, Φ), even if such an inference were unavailable in our prag-
matic situation.38 If so, and if reason relations had constitutive explanations 
in non-evaluative, non-normative terms, then the possibility of reasonable 
inferences from such premises to evaluative or normative conclusions would 
seem to follow.
These considerations push naturally towards reductionism about rea-
sons. For, if reason relations were reducible to some non-normative, non-
 evaluative properties and relations, then the connections that underwrite 
the reduction could perhaps be used to indicate, consistently with the 
autonomy of ethics, what would be reasonable or good about the relevant 
inferences. Otherwise it isn’t easy to see what features of those inferences 
would make them so.
I conclude that I can see no plausible account of explanations of reasons 
in non-evaluative, non-normative terms which satisfies the NF constraint 
on explanations of reasons without naturally pushing in the direction of a 
reductionist account of reasons.
7. Explaining reasons in terms concerning reasons
My argument so far pushes an explanatory turn to reasons to the claim that 
the facts that are reasons are non-evaluative, non-normative facts, and their 
status as reasons can be explained by appeal to normative factors concern-
ing reasons. I’ll now discuss three strategies for trying to construct plausible 
explanations of this kind which might also satisfy the NF constraint.39
One sort of normative factor concerning reasons which could be used to 
explain reasons is the set of conditions under which something is a reason 
to do something. To satisfy the NF constraint, such conditions cannot be 
stated in some further normative terms. For instance, it would be ineligi-
ble to say that, when P is a reason to Φ in C, this is because P plays a role 
in explaining why one ought to Φ. Such conditions must also be stated in 
informative terms, not in terms which do little more than paraphrase rea-
son talk. For instance, it would be either insufficiently informative or in 
violation of the NF constraint to say that, when P is a reason to Φ in C, 
this is because those who consider P would be motivated to Φ if they were 
fully informed and rational. This explanation isn’t informative if talk of 
informed rational motivation merely paraphrases talk of reasons. But, if the 
notion of informed rational motivation is sufficiently independent of the 
notion of a reason to explain the status of some facts as reasons, then such 
explanations violate the NF constraint. For the fundamental explanatory 
work in such accounts isn’t done by normative reasons. Rather, reasons will 
be a function of the desires of fully informed agents whose overall mental 
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economy satisfies various rational requirements of coherence and the like.40 
It seems doubtful that there will turn out to be further normative reasons to 
be rational in this sense.
Another sort of normative factor concerning reasons which could per-
haps be used to explain reasons is a certain sort of substantive claims about 
reasons. One idea along these lines is that it is part of the notion of a rea-
son that certain non-evaluative, non-normative facts stand in reason rela-
tions. For instance, perhaps reason relations are by their nature such that 
the fact that something is painful is a reason to avoid it or make it stop. 
But this seems too strong. One widespread feature of normative discourse is 
that, when a pair of speakers find out that they favor very different sorts of 
things, they tend not to think that they have different enough normative 
concepts to be talking past each other. Rather, each tends to think that the 
other has mistaken, or at least idiosyncratic, normative views.41 This, I take 
it, is how someone who denies that something’s being painful is a reason to 
avoid it or make it stop would usually be classified. I also don’t find it con-
vincing that such people, although they share a concept of a reason with us, 
would have to be classified as mistaken about what reasons are, rather than 
as mistaken simply about what considerations are reasons for what.
A different way of appealing to substantive claims about reasons would 
be to explain why particular facts are reasons by subsuming them under 
general principles to the effect that certain facts are a reason to Φ in C. But, 
even apart from the question of whether a particular normative fact can 
sensibly be said to consist in, or hold in virtue of, a general normative prin-
ciple plus suitable particular non-normative facts, this strategy would com-
mit an explanatory turn to reasons to a surprising range of controversial 
implications. It would require some sort of ‘covering law’ theory of explana-
tion. It would imply that particularist accounts of reasons are false. And it 
would carry a commitment to some particular set of substantive principles 
about reasons. Most importantly, however, this strategy would only push 
the explanatory problem a level up. General principles that specify what is 
a reason for what, necessary or not, seem no more brute or groundless than 
particular facts about what is a reason for what. So this strategy won’t help.
A third sort of factor concerning reasons which could perhaps be used 
to explain reasons is some metaethical account which takes reasons to be a 
certain kind of function of a certain kind of collection of judgments about 
reasons. This general idea can be developed in different ways. One is con-
structivism. On this view, the normative fact that P is a reason to Φ in C is 
constituted by the fact that taking P to be a reason to Φ in C would with-
stand scrutiny from the standpoint of all the other normative judgments 
endorsed by the agent.42 Another is expressivism. On this view, to judge that 
P is a reason to Φ in C is to express a certain kind of psychological attitude, 
and such a judgment counts as correct if it belongs to a set of such attitudes 
that cannot be, in a certain sense, improved upon.43
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The only point I can make here about these views is dialectical. 
Constructivism and expressivism apply equally to reasons and other evalu-
ative and normative notions, and nothing in discussions of constructivism 
and expressivism which touch on the relevant explanatory issues seems to 
point to any rationale for putting reasons in particular at the center stage. 
So, even if these metaethical accounts succeed in explaining reasons in 
terms of judgments about reasons, neither supports an explanatory turn to 
reasons in particular.
I conclude that there seems to be no account of explanations of reasons 
in terms concerning reasons which would support an explanatory turn to 
reasons. But this conclusion requires a caveat. It can be introduced by con-
sidering (theoretical) reasons for belief.
It is plausible that theoretical and practical reasons involve normative 
reason relations of the same type. But it seems that the demand to explain 
why some fact (e.g., that there is loud music and chatter coming from across 
the street) is a reason for some belief (e.g., that the neighbors are having 
a party) might be easily met by something like the following explanatory 
schema: given the fact in question (plus some body of background infor-
mation or facts), the proposition that is the content of the belief is likely 
to be true. Where such explanations are best located in this paper’s frame-
work for explanations of reasons deserves a fuller discussion than I can give 
here. But I suspect that truth and probability, and concepts of epistemic 
utility constructed out of them, aren’t themselves normative notions. (They 
are, of course, co-opted into normative standards in epistemology.) Thus it 
would seem that either explanations of reasons for belief in terms of truth 
and probability are explanations in terms of non-normative factors or that 
probability-raising considerations count as reasons for belief only if, and 
because, false belief is in some sense bad and true belief good (at least when 
the truths are non-trivial and sufficiently important or interesting).
The caveat to my conclusion above is that this second option might not 
have to violate the NF constraint. Some philosophers think that something 
like the explanatory schema above follows from the very nature of belief as 
an attitude that has a ‘constitutive aim’ of truth.44 If fact F makes proposi-
tion P likely to be true (or is otherwise indicative of the truth of P), then F 
is a reason to believe P, given what belief is. The status of a fact as a reason 
for belief could thus be explicable in terms of some norms of reason which 
somehow derive from the aim of truth and by which belief is constitutively 
regulated. True belief might then be held to be good in the sense of accord-
ing with such norms of reason. This might come close enough to counting 
as an explanation of reasons for belief in terms concerning reasons.
Whether a general explanatory turn to reasons is a significant option here 
depends on the prospects for similar explanations of why certain facts are 
reasons for action, intention, and desire, for the various reactive and affec-
tive attitudes, and, on the theoretical side, for attitudes such as supposing 
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and guessing. The bet would be that actions (and so on) also have some or 
other ‘constitutive aim’45 and, moreover, that reasons for action (and so on) 
can be explained in terms of that aim. It is highly controversial that act-
ing and a variety of attitudes for which there can be reasons each have a 
constitutive aim to begin with, and that, if they do, that aim is of the right 
sort, and sufficiently rich, to ground and explain a sufficiently wide range 
of reasons for action.46 I suspect that making all this plausible will prove too 
tall an order. But here I can only note the caveat that this is an option for an 
explanatory turn to reasons which my arguments don’t rule out. Its assess-
ment must be left for future work.
8. Conclusion
For all that this paper shows, there may be constitutive explanations of rea-
sons that satisfy the NF constraint without pushing towards reductionism 
about reasons. I may simply have failed to find them. But it is far from 
clear where to look for such explanations, save perhaps for controversial 
ideas about constitutive aims of action, belief, and all the other attitudes 
for which there are reasons. Thus it seems fair to cast my discussion as a 
challenge to those who find themselves sympathetic to an explanatory turn 
to reasons to construct such explanations. My aim has been to force such 
philosophers into a choice that many of them wouldn’t like: either endorse 
reductionism about reasons or abort the turn to reasons in particular.
The concerns over explanation of evaluative and normative facts which 
fuel this challenge are, as I have noted, quite general. It is therefore possible 
that the considerations I have given can be recruited to generate parallel chal-
lenges against proposals to take some other factors than reasons as explana-
torily fundamental in the normative domain. I don’t particularly worry that 
this means that my discussion shows too much for my purposes. If everyone 
faces a certain problem over explaining evaluative and normative facts, that 
doesn’t mean that no one has a problem. And, in fact,  nothing I say here 
challenges reductionism as a general explanatory hypothesis regarding eval-
uative and normative facts. Whether and to what extent reductive expla-
nations of various evaluative and normative facts or notions are plausible 
depends on such further issues as how well those explanations can capture 
the evaluative or normative character of these facts or notions.
Some people might be inclined to conclude instead that the constraints 
on explaining evaluative and normative facts must be weaker than the NF 
constraint and its analogues. That would affect the main thrust of this 
chapter. Although Section 2 defends the idea that evaluative and norma-
tive facts typically call for explanation, the strength and scope of such a 
constraint clearly deserves further discussion. For what it is worth, my own 
inclination is to think that the rational intelligibility of normative and eval-
uative distinctions and facts significantly constrains what can be regarded 
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as brute in the normative domain and where no further explanation is 
possible. And, again for what it is worth, I suspect that, if there are evalua-
tive or normative facts that have no further explanation, they will be more 
concerned with whether certain aspects of our situation in the world have 
some or other sort of normative significance than whether the particular 
form that their significance takes is constitution of value, provision of 
reasons, or something else. Thus, the current fashion of putting reasons at 
center stage in moral philosophy fails to strike me as a significant innova-
tion in the important enterprise of explaining evaluative and normative 
phenomena.47
Notes
 1. So by ‘explanation’ I mean the content of an answer to a why-question, not the 
activity of giving such an answer. We may need to add that something counts as 
an explanation only if it also satisfies certain epistemic conditions. For example, 
it may be that the content of an answer to a why-question counts as an explana-
tion only if it is (or represents) a body of information that is structured in such 
a way that grasping that body of information would constitute a certain kind of 
epistemic gain regarding what is being explained.
 2. Those who agree include, for example, Raz (2001, p. 50). Parfit (2006, p. 331) 
thinks the bedrock lies nearer the surface.
 3. This isn’t the only kind of reason predicate we deploy, even when talking just 
about normative reasons, in contrast to ‘motivational’ and ‘explanatory’ reasons. 
We can also talk of ‘overall’ reasons to Φ, based on taking into account every-
thing that counts for or against Φing (although how to understand such talk is 
controversial), as well as of ‘sufficient’ reasons to Φ (see, e.g., Skorupski, 2006).
 4. There is controversy over which ontological category includes the considerations 
that provide reasons, but there is a broad consensus that they are facts or propo-
sitions. I keep the assumption disjunctive because, although reason statements 
often specify facts that are the case, we can also talk about whether something 
would be a reason if it were the case, and so statements of the form R(P, C, Φ) 
aren’t uniformly factive with respect to P.
 5. Thus these simplifications don’t prejudge debates between internalist and exter-
nalist theories or Humean and anti-Humean theories of reasons. A huge litera-
ture is devoted to these debates, but see, for example, Williams (1981b), Smith 
(1994a), Dancy (2000a), Schroeder (2007), and, for a useful survey, Finlay and 
Schroeder (2008).
 6. The distinction between facts that are reasons and the normative facts that they 
are reasons is most explicitly drawn by McNaughton and Rawling (2003). For a 
relevant critical discussion of some work on reasons which plays fast and loose 
with the distinction, see Olson (2009). We should probably make the distinction 
tripartite by adding another dimension: the source or ground of the normative 
fact that P is a reason to Φ in C.
 7. They also presume that the fact that prudence requires me to do something is 
a reason to do it, and so is the fact that morality requires me to do something. 
Whether these might be brute facts is unclear.
 8. The problem may be a generalization of the problem mentioned for the moral 
case in Pritchard (1912).
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 9. Note also that skepticism about intrinsic value isn’t uncommon, but in the case 
of reasons one more commonly finds claims such as the following: ‘Genuine 
skepticism about ... whether anything ever counts in favor of anything else in 
the sense typical of reasons ... would be a very difficult position to hold’ (Scanlon, 
1998, p. 19). Such claims often rely on the thought that any argument for skepti-
cism about reasons for belief would be self-defeating. But it seems not at all clear 
that an argument for the truth of the claim that there are no reasons for belief 
must be committed to the existence of reasons for believing its conclusion (cf. 
Olson, 2009, p. 177).
10. It is common to group proposals to explain value in terms of the ‘fittingness’ 
or ‘appropriateness’ of a certain sort of response with a turn to reasons. I won’t 
do this here, because fittingness or appropriateness needn’t be understood as a 
function of reasons or vice versa. Thus the claim that a certain response to some-
thing is fitting and the claim that there is a reason to respond to it in that way 
may not be equivalent.
11. Claims to this effect, but of varying determinacy regarding the scope of the nor-
mative, can be found in Hampton (1998, p. 115), Scanlon (1998, p. 17), Raz (1999, 
p. 67), Dancy (2004a, ch. 1), and Schroeder (2007, p. 81).
12. For the first view, see, for example, Raz (1999, p. 1). The second is mentioned as 
an option in Dancy (2000a, pp. 29–30). It is perhaps endorsed by Crisp (2006, 
p. 62), but this isn’t clear.
13. Or fundamental in so far as the normativity of these other notions is concerned. 
Some of these other notions might have non-normative elements which aren’t 
exhausted by their relation to reasons.
14. See, for example, Scanlon (1998, p. 17) and Dancy (2004a, ch. 1), among many 
others.
15. See, for example, Scanlon (1998, pp. 95–100), Stratton-Lake and Hooker (2006), 
and Väyrynen (2006).
16. The idea comes up in conversations. Skorupski (2006, p. 26) mentions it with 
approval. I take the general tenor of the early chapters of Scanlon (1998) strongly 
to suggest it. See also Parfit (forthcoming, ch. 1).
17. Note that this kind of explanatory demand is compatible with a wide range of 
views about reasons. It can be reasonable not merely if the concept of a reason is 
primitive, but also if reasons are best explicated in terms of their role in explain-
ing what one ought to do (Broome, 2004) or in terms of their bearing on practi-
cal questions (Hieronymi, 2005). If some fact forms part of an explanation of 
why one ought to Φ, or part of an answer to the question of whether to Φ, then 
it is presumably not a brute or arbitrary fact that it does so.
18. See, for example, the literature on the ‘supervenience argument’ against moral 
realism originated by Blackburn (1971). Many writers on necessity deny that 
there are unexplained necessities (see, e.g., Cameron, 2010).
19. I owe these examples to T.M. Scanlon (The John Locke Lectures, University of 
Oxford, 2009).
20. To a first approximation, P is a non-derivative reason to Φ if P is a reason to Φ but 
not (only) because some fact Q distinct from P is a reason to Φ. Instrumentalist 
theories of practical reasons will typically count some instrumental reasons as 
non-derivative in this sense, which seems to be the right result.
21. See Fine (1995, p. 271). Väyrynen (2009a) discusses several different kinds of rela-
tions which the term ‘in virtue of’ may be used to express.
22. No uniform terminology exists here. Such relations as A consists in nothing more than 
B and A is nothing over and above B are called ‘grounding’ (Fine, 2001, pp. 15–16) 
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and ‘constitution’ (Shafer-Landau, 2003, p. 77), among other things. These locu-
tions are usually meant to allow that A and B may be numerically distinct.
23. It is one thing to say that something is a reason to Φ, another to say that it is part 
of what explains why something is a reason to Φ. It might not be the case that all 
explanations of reasons to Φ must themselves be reasons to Φ. But, if so, then it 
is possible for something to play the latter role without playing the former.
24. One example would be the notion of a basic prima facie duty, in the sense of Ross 
(1930, ch. 2).
25. For this example and a useful survey of intrinsicness and intrinsicality, see 
Weatherson (2008).
26. See Quinn (1993), Lance and Little (2006), and Heuer (2006) for remarks that 
seem sympathetic to this claim.
27. Unless, surprisingly indeed, to be painful is to have other properties that provide 
certain kinds of reasons.
28. See Raz (2001, pp. 165–6), Wallace (2002, p. 448), Scanlon (2002, p. 513), and 
Dancy (2004a, ch. 2).
29. Different forms of value-based accounts of reasons can be found, for example, in 
Moore (1903), Quinn (1993), Lawrence (1995), Raz (1999; 2001), Audi (2006), and 
Heuer (2006).
30. For instance, being a good-making feature would have to be nothing over and 
above providing certain kinds of reasons for actions or attitudes.
31. See Williams (1985, pp. 128–9, 140–1) and much of the literature following his 
discussion. Against this, Väyrynen (2009b) argues that the evaluations which 
may be conveyed by using predicates expressing thick concepts aren’t located in 
their sense or semantic content.
32. This claim is developed and endorsed by Stratton-Lake and Hooker (2006, 
p. 152).
33. This is to understand the fact that something is generous as an existential fact 
that there are reasons, given by certain properties, to respond to it in certain 
favorable ways. According to the buck-passing account of value, the fact that 
something is good is a similar existential fact. Such existential facts about rea-
sons can be derivative reasons.
34. This can be seen by considering the antecedent in the standard formulation of 
weak and strong property supervenience of the normative on the non- normative. 
Strong supervenience holds that: □[(?x) (B*x & Ax) ? □(?y)(B*y ? Ay)], where A 
is a normative property and ‘B*’ is the ‘total’ non-normative base property. Weak 
supervenience drops the second necessity operator (‘□’). The antecedents of 
these supervenience claims hold only if something has the normative property 
A; normative nihilism denies this. Varying the modal strengths of the necessity 
operators generates different versions of these supervenience claims.
35. These claims aren’t in dispute in the supervenience literature. See, for example, 
McLaughlin and Bennett (2008).
36. For a sustained defense of reductionism about reasons along these lines, see 
Schroeder (2007, ch. 4).
37. See Sturgeon (2002). As Sturgeon notes, similar inference barriers seem to appear 
in many other domains. For an extended discussion of inferring ‘ought’ from ‘is’ 
without such auxiliary premises, see Zimmerman (2010, ch. 5). (I am here ignor-
ing the well-known ‘cheap’ counter-examples to the autonomy of ethics.)
38. At least in so far as such explanations are abductive or non-monotonic, there 
is no reason to suppose that they would always have to predict or retrodict the 
holding of particular reason relations. A perhaps related point is that  explanation 
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of reasons is one thing (theoretical), deliberation about what to do is another 
(practical).
39. Another strategy, which I cannot discuss properly here, is to argue that what 
explains why P is occurrently a reason to Φ is that P has a disposition to be a 
reason to Φ in C and the circumstances C obtain. (For a discussion of such ‘nor-
mative dispositions,’ see Robinson, 2006.) But I suspect that the arguments I 
have given so far can be applied also against taking such normative disposi-
tions as the fundamental units of explanations of reasons. If properties are the 
sorts of things that can have dispositions to begin with, it might be plausible 
that some evaluative and normative properties are disposed to give reasons to 
Φ in C in virtue of their particular evaluative or normative character; but this 
would violate the NF constraint. It seems much harder to motivate the idea that 
non-evaluative, non-normative properties are disposed to give reasons to Φ in C. 
That certain such properties bear such a normative disposition isn’t a brute fact, 
in my opinion. But what in such properties would explain why they are so dis-
posed? This question might have a satisfactory answer if normative dispositions 
were reducible to a non-evaluative, non-normative basis that explains why the 
disposition is manifested when it is. But I don’t see how an appeal to normative 
dispositions that doesn’t involve reductionism can help explain reasons consist-
ently with the NF constraint. Still, it may well be that these doubts are too hasty 
and deserve further discussion.
40. For an analysis of normative reasons in such terms, see, for example, Smith 
(1994a, ch. 5).
41. For one recent discussion of this point and some of its implications, see Merli 
(2009).
42. See especially Street (2008) and the works cited therein. Constructivists of 
this sort don’t usually think that the attitude of taking something to be a rea-
son can be characterized in non-normative terms, but only in certain sorts of 
primitive normative terms (see Street, 2008, 239–42). Note also that this view 
wouldn’t seem to furnish a transcendental argument to the effect that, if there 
are to be any reasons at all, there must be reasons for thinking along the lines 
of some procedure for determining what reasons there are for particular agents 
to do what.
43. See, for example, Blackburn (1988) and Gibbard (2003, pp. 188–91). Although 
expressivists think that what reasons one has can only be assessed against a 
standpoint constituted by other judgments about reasons, they also think that 
the attitude expressed by such judgments – the attitude of counting P as favor-
ing Φing in C – can be described without using the concept of a reason. But 
this prong of expressivist accounts of reasons doesn’t seem to be intended to 
furnish the sorts of explanations of normative reasons that are the focus of this 
paper.
44. The literature on the ‘aim of belief’ is extensive, but see, for example, Velleman 
(2000, ch. 11) and Wedgwood (2002).
45. The literature on the ‘constitutive aim of action’ is again extensive, but see, for 
example, Velleman (2000, ch. 6–8 and ‘Introduction’), Korsgaard (2009), and, for 
one representative critical discussion, Enoch (2006).
46. Various specifications of such constitutive aims would be of the wrong sort to 
suit an explanatory turn to reasons. If the constitutive aim of action were the 
good, then explanations of reasons for action in terms of this aim would violate 
the NF constraint. And would it be informative and non-circular for an explana-
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tory turn to reasons to exploit a constitutive aim of action if that aim were acting 
in accordance with reasons?
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